The Battle of Nalapani was the first battle of the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814–1816.
The 8th Light Dragoons – Nalapani 31 October 1814
When, in October 1814, the aggressive policy of the government in Katmandu finally brought Britain and Nepal to blows, an Anglo-Indian army, in accordance with a plan formulated by the Governor-General, Lord Moria, advanced into Gurkha territory in five columns.
Attached to the column commanded by General Robert Rollo Gillespie was a 100-strong squadron of the 8th Light Dragoons, under Captain N Brutton. Gillespie’s orders were to clear the passage of the Dehra Dun (valley of Dehra) by the end of October and be ready to cooperate with the movements to be carried out before 1 November by the column to the west under Major-General David Ochterlony.
On the 19th of October, the advance guard of Gillespie’s force of 4,500 men entered the Dun, and three days later the main body occupied the town of Dehra.
As the British advanced, the Gurkhas fell back on the fort of Kalanga, or Nalapani, which was situated on the highest point of one of the low spurs that jut southward into the Dun from its northern rim of mountains. On its western side, the Kalanga spur plunged almost vertically for 1,000 feet to the valley floor. The eastern flank sloped away more gently until, about a mile from the summit, it suddenly dropped 600 feet to the Song River.
The most accessible approach was southern, which climbed steadily but not too steeply, for about three miles before reaching the so-called tableland. This last was a narrow strip of fairly level ground 200 feet below the summit and separated from it by the deep furrow of the Nalapani, a watercourse which came down from the north and then turned west in its descent from the valley. The summit was thus in the form of a knoll, with a natural moat on two sides. Its slopes formed a glacis for the fort, which was perched on its highest point.
The spur was thickly planted with birch and poplar, except in the vicinity of the fort, where the ground was open. The fort was irregular in shape, following the contours of the ground. Its outer defences, no more than twelve feet high, consisted of a double palisade filled with stones, surmounting a mud rampart. It was reckoned to harbour some 600 people, of whom not more than half could have been in any sense soldiers.
Kalanga presented Gillespie with a difficult problem. He had been ordered to cooperate with Ochterlony westwards by 1 November, but obviously, he could not do so till this enemy position on his flank, which as soon as he advanced westward would become a threat to his rear, had been taken or masked. His force was insufficient to detach troops to contain the fort and still cooperate with Ochterlony. He had, therefore, no choice but to take it.
Gillespie drew up plans for a concentric attack against Kalanga, his intention being to cut the garrison’s line of retreat. Three columns were to circle around the fort and attack it from the east, north and north-west, while the main force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter, and the reserve, under Major John Ludlow, were to attack from the table-land.
On 30 October Ludlow’s and Carpenters’ columns, without meeting any opposition, took up position on the level ground south of Kalanga. During the night, working parties constructed a battery nearly 600 yards from the fort, and, by daylight, ten light field pieces had been brought up on elephants and had opened fire. At two o’clock the same morning the three columns that were to attack from the east, north and northeast began the march to their start lines. Their commanding officers had been told that, at about 10 am, there would be a discharge of five guns, preceded by five minutes of silence. The attack would begin exactly two hours later.
At 8 am, the bombardment has had but little effect on the fort, Gillespie lost his patience and ordered the signal for the attack to be given. This was a serious blunder, for the officers with the detached columns, thinking they did not need to pay special attention to the pattern of the gunfire for another two hours, did not recognise the signal.
Just before 9 am a party of Gurkhas, who had moved out of the fort during the night to a position at the eastern end of the table-land in order to harass the parties working at the battery, moved up with the obvious intention of taking the guns in the flank. Gillespie, in great excitement, ordered a howitzer to be turned on them. A few rounds of canister checked the party and, when charged by a group of sepoys at bayonet point, they dispersed and began to retreat. The General thereupon ordered Carpenter and Ludlow to pursue them and enter the fort upon their backs.
Carpenters column consisted of about 600 men, including two companies of the 1st Battalion, 53rd Foot and a 50-strong dismounted detachment of the 8th Light Dragoons. It was supported by Ludlow’s reserve, originally 9OO-strong, but now reduced to 136 sepoys and another 50-strong detachment of the 8th LD as a result of successive detachments made during the night. The dismounted dragoons, led by Captain Brutton, headed the combined column of attack.
Advancing with great dash, they sprinted down the tableland, veered sharply left to cross the Nalapani, and surged up the eastern glacis of the fort in pursuit of the retreating Gurkhas. But the cavalrymen set a pace that the infantry, encumbered by their knapsacks and muskets, and the pioneers, labouring under their scaling ladders, could not equal. When they were between 60-80 yards from the fort, the dragoons reached a hutted village, protected by a semi-circular stockade.
They drove the Gurkhas from this position but now found that their impetuosity had carried them much too far in advance, and that they were entirely unsupported. Gurkha soldiers, swarming over the walls of the fort to support their comrades, engaged the oncoming dragoons. Close hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in which the Gurkhas enjoyed the same advantage as the Roman legionary, with his gladius and scutum over the Celtic warrior with his long sword. With their kukris, the Gurkhas were able to get within the points of the dragoon’s long sabres, and with their small round shields, carried on the left arm, parry every cut before it could be completed.
Such was the Gurkha warrior’s dexterity with his shield that, as one dragoon recalled later: “There was no end to the damn pot lid, no getting over, nor under, nor round about it. It was like bad luck – everywhere.” (Quoted in Pemble, 1971, 148) Within a few minutes, the dragoons had to give way, having lost 4 killed and 58 wounded. The onslaught having been checked, the Gurkhas clambered back into the fort, ready to resist the next wave of assailants.
The infantry part of the combined column now came up, to be met with heavy small-arms fire. Attempts were made to plant ladders against the walls, but a gun placed at the open wicket of the fort, so as to enfilade this portion of the front, not only swept away the leading ranks of the storming party, which advanced gallantly enough but also caused panic among the troops supporting them. These last, instead of pressing on, began firing away at the walls.
They kept up this totally ineffective fusillade for a while, then turned and ran. Only with great difficulty were they rallied, and brought back to a position within the captured stockade. The ladders were left among the huts, which caught fire about this time, and so all means of entering the fort were lost.
So far nothing had been seen or heard of the three detached columns. One messenger after another was sent by different routes to hurry them forward, but not one reached his destination.
On hearing that the attack has been repulsed, a furious Gillespie ordered forward three more companies of the 1/53rd, which had just arrived in the battery, and two Bengal Horse Artillery guns under Lieutenant C.P. Kennedy, to blow open the gates. The guns were pulled forward by drag ropes manned by men of the 53rd. After a difficult ascent, these reinforcements came to the captured stockade, where Ludlow’s and Carpenter’s columns were still sheltering from the heavy fire. Gillespie, accompanied by his staff and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Westenra, the 8th’s commanding officer, came up with them here, and there was a hasty council of war.
One of the dragoons of Ludlow’s column had found, in the northwest wall, a gateway to the fort, in which was set a wicket. He offered to guide the General to it. Gillespie eagerly agreed, and accompanied now by Ludlow and the surviving dragoons, the three companies of the 53rd went forward, leaving one of the guns at the stockade to cover the advance.
Passing through the village, the column turned right about 50-60 yards from the fort and proceeded round to its north-western side. There, sure enough, was the wicket, protected by “some loose stones piled up about four feet high, and above them two strong bars of wood.” (Stubbs, 1877, II, 7) Although a gun pointed at the troops through this obstacle, and a number of matchlocks from over the walls, hardly a shot was fired as they advanced up the lane, partially screened by smoke from the burning huts. Gillespie and his staff led, followed by men of the 53rd, steadily dragging on the remaining gun.
Under his order, Lieutenant Kennedy ran on ahead to select a position for the gun, which was brought to within thirty or forty yards of the gateway, as far as it could go. Although it opened fire, the Gurkha’s reply provide too much for the 53rd. They began to waver, and, as they did so, arrows and fire of matchlocks thinned the ranks of their leading sub-divisions. Gillespie repeatedly ordered them to charge, but they would not move. The fire of the gun broke the wooden bars across the entrance of the fort, but a party of Gurkhas sallied out and cut the only sponge staff in two.
Gillespie was now determined to attack with the horse artillerymen alone, probably in the hope that the infantry would follow. He, therefore, ordered the artillerymen to arm themselves with the muskets of the dead, of which there was a plentiful supply. When this was done he put himself at their head, sword in one hand and double-barrelled pistol in the other. He had only gone a pace or two forward when a bullet struck him through the heart, killing him instantly. His body was carried to the rear by some of the artillerymen, and the order was given to retire. But in the confusion, it was not heard in front, and the gun and gunners were nearly lost.
Fortunately, one of the detached columns appeared at this time and assisted in getting the gun away and covering the retreat.
During the assault on Kalanga, the 8th Light Dragoons lost Lieutenant-Colonel Westenra, Captain Brutton and 3 other officers wounded, 1 mortally. Of the rest of the squadron, 3 rank and file were killed, 4 sergeants, 1 trumpeter and 49 rank and file wounded and 1 private missing.
The Regiment’s bravery was recognised by Lord Moira, a veteran of the American War of Independence, who wrote: “A detachment of the R: Irish Light Dragoons, who volunteering their services to lead the attack on foot, behaved with extraordinary firmness.” (Quoted in Murray, 1928, I, 372).
It is interesting to note that the squadron sergeant-major, John Mawdsley, was recommended for a commission in recognition of his gallantry in the assault.
Despite considerable odds, both in terms of numbers and firepower, the 600-strong garrison successfully held out against more than 5,000 British troops for over a month.
After two costly and unsuccessful attempts to seize the fort by direct attack, the British changed their approach and sought to force the garrison to surrender by cutting off the fort’s external water supply. Having suffered three days of thirst, on the last day of the siege, the fort’s commander, Balbhadra, refusing to surrender, led the 70 surviving members of the garrison in a charge against the besieging force. Fighting their way out of the fort, the survivors escaped into the nearby hills.
Sources
- J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. XI, Macmillan, London, 1923.
- Rev. R.H. Murray, The History of the VllI King’s Royal Irish Hussars, 1693-1927, vol. I, W. Heffer & Sons, Cambridge, 1928.
- J. Pemble, The Invasion of Nepal: John Company at War, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971.
- Major F.W. Stubbs, History of the Organisation, Equipment, and Ware Services of the Regiment of Bengal Artillery, vol. II, Henry S. King, London, 1877.
- E.Wakeham, The Bravest Soldier: Sir Rollo Gillespie, 1766-1814, William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1937.
