The official report on the “Pedlar Mission”, infiltration into France

REPORT ON THE PEDLAR MISSION – 25th September 1944

The PEDLAR mission was sent to France in the early part of July after several changes with regard to its purpose for the carrying out of certain demolitions and the obtaining of certain information with regard to enemy movements as set out in its ‘Ordre de mission‘.

The composition of the mission was as follows;-

• Major BODINGTON – the leader
• Captain HARRATT – the second in command
• Lieutenant CORMIER – arms and demolition specialist
• Sergeant ROE
• Sergeant SOWDEN – W/T’s

The mission left for the Field in three phrases: Captain Harratt, who was unable to jump, went to GIBRALTAR, then MADRID, and finally came up to rejoin me in the MARNE department after an adventurous journey details of which are attached in a separate report. Lieutenant CORMIER and the two Sergeants left by air and were successfully parachuted to the DIPLOMAT circuit, on July 9th. I myself followed two days later, also to the DIPLOMAT circuit.

Contact was made between myself and the airborne element of the mission, which had already arrived, immediately. Captain Harratt was only able to rejoin me the day before the crossing of the MARNE in the EPERNAY district by the American forces. Subsequently, for reasons which will be explained further on the PEDLAR mission proceeded into the HAUTE MARNE where work was carried out centred on MONTIER-en-DER and in the neighbourhood of CHAUMONT.

The original objectives of the mission, in spite of lack of equipment, were to a great extent carried out according to instructions. In addition, a considerable quantity of intelligence was sent for which the thanks of the armies concerned were received.

There is no doubt that much more could ha e been done had the PEDLAR mission received the assistance to which it considered itself entitled. Comments in this respect will be found below.

After the capture of CHAUMONT, the mission spent some days tidying up the situation in the various sectors to which PEDLAR had been assigned, and the entire mission returned on September 24th, according to orders, and reported to H.Q. In the report which follows it will be appreciated that exact dates cannot be given owing to the fact that the work was largely clandestine and security considerations have always forbidden the keeping of any kind of notes with regard to activities of organisers in the Field. In any case, exact dates are probably unessential and the results are the things that count.

The report which follows will be divided into several sections:-

1. As near an account as possible chronologically of the activities of its members,
2. The results obtained,
3. Comments on the facilities for work carried out during the period July l0th to September 24th,
4. Comments on the general situation and the areas affected,
5. Conclusions and recommendations.

1. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES

It is to be noted that personal messages to me from Captain Harratt from GIBRALTAR and SPAIN were never re-transmitted to me.

As a result, while I attempted by various means to put myself in contact with resisting elements in the MARNE, the other members were placed at the disposal of the DIPLOMAT circuit in their specialised branches. Lieutenant Cormier in the course of the following three and a half weeks rendered considerable services to a number of the groups of the DIPLOMAT circuit, both instructionally and operationally. Details of these activities will be found in this report and in DIPLOMAT’s report.

In the meanwhile, deprived of any form of credentials, in spite of my request before leaving, to the F.F.I.leaders in the MARNE, I was forced to attempt to make contact with them as best I could The result as may naturally be suppressed, was extremely galling. F.F.I. leaders had no reason whatever to have any confidence in me, particularly in an area where German infiltration had been extremely heavy, and every form of contact had become suspect.

An illustration of what happened can be given in the case of SEZANNE, where I had hopes of being able to contact responsible French officers. Subordinates, with whom I was placed in contact, were ready, particularly in view of the persons accompanying me to take my word as to my mission. The leaders, however, repeatedly refused to come to see me.

As I was in the position of having a radio operator with a Jed sat nearby, I offered as proof to transmit any ciphered message they liked to London and to receive an immediate reply. I was informed that there were no batteries available and that there was no electric current. I replied that I had a Jed set which required neither. I was not believed.

On persisting, I was told that I would be arrested. I offered to remain under an armed guard in a room until the reply had been received from London H.Q. This too was refused. Finally, I had to retire from SEZANNE with nothing achieved. Similar stories could be told with regard to other centres.

Finally, at the end of three and a half or four weeks, I had to take the decision of entering the MARNE in conditions of considerable insecurity. I had, however, by that time been able to put myself into contact with resistance elements at SAINT DlZTER in the HAUTE MARNE and therefore a department which I was not officially supposed to touch owing to the fact that intelligence officers had greater psychological insight than others.

There I found a group of official F.F.I. who had been waiting five months for an operation on an accepted ground. Traffic, both by road and rail was running smoothly and uninterruptedly owing to the complete lack of any arms or munitions. I promised to send this group an instructional officer, Lieutenant Cormier and a W/T operator, which I did. We were ultimately thanked both by the ‘prefot’ and the maire’ of SAINT DIZIER for “saving the town.

Had I not entirely by accident fallen on this group, I doubt whether any arms whatsoever would have been received by the SAINT DIZTER F.F.I. and certainly no work would have been done. The HAUTE MARNE authorities were still unable to give me any assistance in the MARNE and I, therefore, proceeded to EPERNAY accompanied by two Frenchmen lent to me by DIPLOMAT, whose services were later invaluable, and by Sergeant Sowden.

We were forced to live extremely precariously for two days since we had no contact and, as could be foreseen, we were immediately and very efficiently denounced by agents of the Gestapo. It is only by the grace of God and a fairly intelligently built-up system of counter-espionage, to which the Surete Nationale and the French Police contributed that we are not all in Germany today.

It is also due to the fact that, exceptionally, the Feldgendarmerie made a fatal mistake by going to the wrong address, and that a munitions train was blown up nearby on the same day, thus occupying the attention of the German authorities for several hours. I was able to evacuate EPERNAY in the space of ninety minutes’ Sergeant Sowden spent twenty-four hours hidden in a vineyard; the two Frenchmen slept in haystacks in the nearby countryside, and I cycled back to TROYES, a hundred and twenty kilometres, in order to re-organise our efforts. Needless to say the F.F.l. leaders became fully aware of what had happened and considered us more dangerous than ever to their security.

Within twenty-four hours I re-established our headquarters at BOUZY, between EPERNAY and CHALONS, and there, in spite of the fact that subsequently, German Supremo H.Q. established itself three kilometres away, at VERZY, we were able to regroup and to start our work. Local resistance organisations there had virtually no arms or equipment, in spite of the fact that I discovered that there was a number of arms dumps still hidden underground. Although the British and American armies were advancing we started carrying out our operations by borrowing equipment from DIPLOMAT and eventually by getting some of the dumps unearthed.

I was finally able to get them a reception which I made myself, and which gave sufficient arms for some 200 men. With this equipment and by devices of a primitive nature, they were able to carry out a considerable amount of destructive work against the enemy.

At BOUZY I did my best to collect the better elements but found that the F.F.I. command was divided between EPERNAY, CHALONS and REIMS, the latter town of which I had been told not to contact in any circumstances. Confusion was complete and nobody knew from whom they should receive orders. This in any case did not matter since few people were receiving orders anyway.

Groups of F.F.I., both officially incorporated and independent, as a result, expressed their willingness to help in carrying out the instructions I gave them. Patrols were organised, and destructive work on railways and telecommunications was carried out to the best of our ability. T was also able to set up, with the assistance of elements of the Gendannerie, an intelligence not-work which enabled us to keep track of German preparations for defence on sectors between DORMANS to the west of EPERNAY. and CHALONS. Much of this intelligence was immediately re-transmitted to London, although conditions for sending were both difficult and perilous.

On returning one evening in the middle of August, I found waiting for me a large delegation of F.F.I. leaders from EPERNAY and CHALONS, accompanied by senior inspectors of the Surate, the S.R. and the Police. A friendly discussion ensued, in the course of which;

(a) they expressed their eagerness to co-operate,
(b) they revealed that one of them had just received information on my arrival from the D.M.R., who had been informed of my mission on July 6th, and
(c) they stated that they were desperately awaiting deliveries of arms, of which they were badly in need, and which were conspicuous by their absence.

Their feelings can be summed up by an exclamation made by one of them, to wit “PIERRE”, chief of the F.F.I., EPERNAY, who said: “Oh, if we had only known you were here five weeks ago”.

It was also brought to light during this conversation that the elements I was using west of EPERNAY had been, in fact, embodied in the F.F.I., but that they, like all the others, had been made desperate by the lack of assistance and had been ready to accept help from whatever reasonable source. From this moment our life became easier. Shortly after this, and with the American armies coming up the MARNE, I sent two guides from EPERNAY, one of whom was a Surete inspector named CESARI, to meet the American forward units in the neighbourhood of COULOMMIERS. They carried out their task with great efficiency and were of considerable assistance to the U.S. commanders.

Soon afterwards, with the Americans approaching the south bank of the MARNE between EPERNAY and CHALONS, Captain Harratt suddenly arrived, having swum the MARNE under the eyes of the Germans. Next morning at dawn, with considerable courage, he returned to the American lines with information as to the possibilities of crossing the river without the aid of bridges.

CHALONS fell comparatively easily, and we hope partly due to the intelligence we gave. Our task was then to attempt to mop up and to dislocate the groups of Germans who were crossing the MARNE by secret means, which we did by means of patrols.

It then became evident that more important work awaited us further east, and with the agreement of H.Q., we transferred our headquarters to MONTIER-en-DER, where Lieutenant Cormier and Sergeant Roe had been carrying on extremely well. MONTIER had officially been liberated: we found, however, that the area was one which was being extensively used for the official escape routes of German troops in pockets ranging from 10 to 250. In addition, armoured vehicles were also slipping through during the night. A typical example of this was the meeting between Captain Harratt, alone in his car, and four German tanks, advancing at about five kilometres an hour, noiselessly, and without lights. Armed with a Sten, Captain Harratt was obviously unable to cope with the situation with any effect, and he modestly averted his gaze. So did the drivers of the tanks, and all was well.

We were able in the ensuring few days to plot the exact escape routes and with the limited means at our disposal to patrol them. It is quite certain that we denied their use to the enemy; but, once again, it is obvious that we could have done a great deal more had I not been forced to seize the arms out of the hands of one patrol to give them to another immediately, also if the members of these patrols had had anything but cotton shirts to keep them warm during the course of freezing nights.

The German traffic in this area became less, and with the news that the Leclere Armoured Division was making for CHAUMONT and that the 71h US Army proposed linking up with it there, at the request of the Commander of the French 6th Military region, Colonel PUCCINELLI, we again transferred our headquarters, this time to SEXFONTAINE. Our movements in the HAUTE MARNE were in accordance with the desires expressed by Colonel POWELL, in charge of the S.F. Division of the 3rd US Army, then situated near CHALONS.

Inconveniently for us, because few people appear to realise the extraordinary difficulties which agents and missions encountered in moving round, not only before the arrival of the American Army but afterwards.

Our force was by this time growing, and with the help of certain extremely efficient French officers, we had formed a small staff and had borrowed units both from the MARNE and the AUBE departments to re-enforce the local elements, which were few. Our force in front of CHAUMONT eventually numbered nearly 1,000 men, a great many of whom were by that time in uniform, but still insufficiently clad for the arduous work they had to do. Most of the imported companies had their own arms, but just barely enough, and certainly some of the men had done no military service whatever, were extremely green.

In view of the fact that at the request of the 3rd Army we were expected to cut supply lines out of CHAUMONT, it may be imagined how thinly we were spread out and how perilous was the position of certain outposts in view of the fact that the German patrols consisted of well trained, battle experienced German N.C.Os and men. CHAUMONT was eventually evacuated by the Germans in good order by the one escape route which had been left open for them deliberately so that they would have to retire in the direction where they could be snapped up by further advanced armoured units; and once again our operation may be considered to have been very largely successful, as the food situation at CHAUMONT had become drastic.

With the fall of CHAUMONT, apart from a few mopping-up operations, little remained to be done. The possibilities of coordination between elements of the F.F.I. and ourselves remained extremely precarious owing to the fact that responsible officers had to drive up to five hundred kilometres a day in order to keep in touch at all. We, therefore, sent back the imported units to their mustering points and then returned to our previous headquarters along the line, in order to tie things up.

It was only two days before we decided to do this that we finally received a dropping operation in broad daylight with sufficient arms to mount another two hundred men. By this time the arms were practically useless, but we distributed them to groups who had the intention of returning and volunteering for the new French Army.

We received instructions to proceed back to London H.Q. as early as possible and did so as we were satisfied that the more elementary bits of tidying up had been carried out. There is not the slightest doubt that a large amount of work remained still to be done, and civil authorities in the AUBE, the MARNE and the HAUTE MARNE took a great deal of trouble to ask us to stay to help them. Since, however, we had received orders, so were not able to do anything else but return.

We trust that in agreement with the F.F.I or the French Military authorities it may be possible for us to return to work in coordination with them for the task of clearing up a large number of extremely dangerous elements. We have their confidence and it would be silly to throw this away. We proceeded to Paris and reported as instructed to Major Alastair Hamilton on September 22nd, and returned to London on September 24th.

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2. RESULTS OBTAINED

Certainly, there was no other man available who could have carried this out and it proved to have been a tremendous inconvenience to German traffic. In order to carry out this operation, he was forced to dive ten feet underwater five times, and remain there for over a minute each time to fix the charges. This exploit became almost legendary in the region and deserves the highest commendation.

Once we managed to have a reception in the MARNE and obtain some arms, the main routes used by the Germans west of EPERNAY were constantly and persistently attacked. Telephone lines and cables were either ripped to pieces or short-circuited four or five times a week and the immobilisation of road traffic was assured on almost every line.

This work was in fact started before we received our delivery, by means of borrowing or begging explosives and firearms, either from the enemy or from persistently inactive elements. The leader of the active groups we employed, known to the EPERNAY F.F.I. as “GABY”, was full of ardour and the groups under his command although somewhat rag-tag and bob-tail were quite fearless.

It is impossible to give one by one the attacks made since the only way in which German traffic could be usefully impeded was by continuous and uninterrupted action.

Between EPERNAY and CHALONS, the situation was more difficult since, as I have stated above, groups in different villages, separated only by two or three kilometres, officially much exercised as to whom they should obey. I also found, as reported in telegrams, that some arms and explosives dumps remained underground, in spite of the rapid approach of the American forces and were serving nobody.

The willingness of the more active elements could serve no purpose without the necessary tools. I was forced to once again beg and borrow the minimum of equipment with which we carried on and attacked the main CHALONS – EPERNAY and CHALON – REIMS railway lines, short-circuited and cut the main telephone, and otherwise interfered with the Wehrmacht’s activities.

Owing to the total absence of tyre-bursters, of which, so far as I knew, there were tons of thousands in England, I organised the local blacksmiths to make pointed bits of iron out of old horseshoes, with which we successfully, if rather surprisingly, managed to hold up convoys of up to eighty vehicles. Our work was not helped by the fact that the Germans installed one of their main W/T emitting stations one and a half kilometres away from us at AMBONNAY, and that the German supreme command then made matters worse by installing itself at VERZY, only a few kilometres away. It is all to the credit of Sergeant Sowden, who incidentally speaks not a word of French, that he consistently sent up to four hundred groups a day without demur.

Incidentally, as a result of our request the RAF carried out a most effective bombing both of TOURS airfield, where the Udet Fighter Squadron was based and was largely exterminated, and of von KLUGE’s HQ at VERZY. Von KLUGE himself had a miraculous escape by the simple process of letting his other officers be killed taking a remaining staff car and driving it himself rapidly into the countryside.

After the arrival of the Americans at CHALONS, the Germans withdrew from this sector but considerable infiltration was being carried out over the MARNE. Patrols were organised and one of them managed to discover a small wooden bridge, well constructed a few inches below the surface of the water across the MARNE. Over this bridge three to four hundred Germans a night were crossing until we permanently destroyed it. We could also have destroyed a good many of the Germans if we had had sufficient arms.

That these passages, as in other cases, were highly organised, was proved by the constant series of flare signals which used to be made on both sides of the river every night, in addition to which many groups of Germans hidden in the forests or woods were equipped with W/T emitting posts.

Some cases were found of Germans even being helped on their way by people who would do anything to avoid a scrap in their particular locality. From a human point of view, this may be understandable to a certain extent, but it certainly did not help our work.

Once again German preparations for escape routes were highly organised and their intelligence system deserves the highest praise. Our work in the neighbourhood of CHAUMONT was strictly in accordance with the desires of the US Third Army. We were asked, in conjunction with Colonel MICHEL, head of the HAUTE MARNE F.F.I. and whom I managed to visit behind the German lines, to cut supply routes to the east, north and west of CHAUMONT. The first night or two we held fifteen kilometres of essential road with 150 men, later I received reinforcements and we were able to strengthen the posts and to spread further afield.

Conditions were arduous, it was bitterly cold and German patrols, working not only in front of us but behind us, were made up of highly skilled and trained reconnaissance elements. The few American armoured units in the villages had received strict instructions that in no circumstances were they to move. The result was that even when our posts were attacked they could afford us no assistance whatever. Finally, one night we found that they had gone altogether. It is gratifying to be able to state that our casualties, in spite of this, were light and consisted of only seven men killed and half a dozen wounded. We were in positions which, unfortunately, owing to the lie of the ground round CHAUMONT, could be observed by the enemy, who persistently tried to find out how numerous we were. This, I think. he never did find out, and the coming and going of trucks and motor cars probably made him believe we were stronger than we were in actual fact. As a result, we may say that his supply patrols were considerably hampered, and in several cases completely stopped.

We were also able to carry out a number of offensive patrols which, if they had no serious military effect, made the enemy extremely chary of moving about with the freedom to which he had previously been accustomed.

That, in sum, is the total of our military activity. What was less expected, and often very trying, particularly in the HAUTE MARNE, was that the authorities came to us for guidance in civil matters, such as the control of movement by the population, and food and traffic regulations. The Prefect of the HAUTE MARNE, then only partially liberated, came to visit us accompanied by several officials from SAINT DIZIER. both to thank us for our work and to ask for our co-operation. We did our best, but it is difficult in such circumstances to do several things at once. Among other things, however, we managed to get a train going between MONTIER and SAINT DIZIER. and ultimately to PARIS, with supplies, by the simple process of finding a locomotive at one end. trucks at another, and making them meet.

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3. COMMENTS ON THE FACILITIES FOR WORK CARRIED OUT DURING – THE PERIOD JULY l0^th TO SEPTEMBER 24^th

It is to be regretted that the PEDLAR mission was not supplied with written credentials to F.F.I. leaders from the start, since, if this had been done, as I originally requested, much valuable time would have been saved and members of the mission would not have run grave and unnecessary risks of arrest as was the case. Unfortunately, the telegram sent to the D.M.R., who lived a considerable distance away from the scene of the operations, at a time when transport was virtually impossible, did not have the required effect. For some reason, not known to me, the subordinate chiefs were not advised of its receipt, and as a result, a justifiable suspicion of our bona fides arose.

It must be remembered that in the MARNE and the HAUTE MARNE the activities of the Gestapo had in recent months been such that most of the competent French leaders had been arrested, that there was considerable dislocation among elements and that there was a very understandable fear of further German infiltration into existing organisations. Once the misunderstandings were cleared up there were the most willing offers of collaboration, which were most useful and whole-hearted. The effectiveness of these offers, however, was hampered by other factors.

I found that not only we but also the F.F.I. in the MARNE and the HAUTE MARNE were I literally starved of any form of adequate assistance either in the supply of arms or in the supply of absolutely essential clothing. I made desperate efforts by repeating orders for the F.F.I. through my own channels to fill the gaps. They were not filled. It is a truism to say that “bush intelligence” exists throughout an occupied country; resistance organisations in the MARNE and the HAUTE MARNE were perfectly aware that large deliveries were being made to areas where there appeared to be comparatively few Germans and large stocks of arms and munitions.

The reason for the lack of supplies to those departments is beyond my ken, but I feel it my duty to state the bare fact; if it is only to justify any possible charge of inaction on the part of many brave men.

The question of transport was one which was acute. Petrol from civilian sources could only be obtained at a price in the neighbourhood of one hundred or one hundred twenty francs a litre and usually what trucks or cars were available were of the gas type and in extremely poor repair. When the Americans did arrive, they were themselves extremely short of fuel.

I must pay tribute to their anxiety to help us wherever they could, but one cannot supply a commodity that does not exist. In many cases, American forward units were held up for upwards of three days because fuel supplies had not come up. They could hardly be expected to give us our requirements, which mounted in the latter stages to four or five hundred litres a day, plus the necessary oil.

Since we were receiving no arms by air it was obviously quite out of the question to suggest that we might also receive fuel.

One mix up and one tentative mix up in W/T communications occurred owing to the splitting up, which had been foreseen in London, of the PEDLAR command. I wish, however, while accepting possibly twenty per cent of the blame for the first mix up, to state that if H.Q. had paused one moment to realise how we stood, there was no necessity whatever for the garbled and indecipherable messages which both W/T operators received.

All messages were in cyphers perfectly understandable to H.Q. and there was certainly no excuse for me to receive messages destined for Lieutenant Cormier and vice versa when we were something like a hundred miles apart. In the second case, I had put up a proposition to which I received a reply that it all made nonsense and that I was to obey “the following instructions”. The following instructions sent were word for word the plan I had proposed twenty-four hours earlier. I was not particularly pleased by the formula, “your scheme haywire, order you obey following instructions”. I have had sufficient experience in the field, more than most in H.Q., not to propose a “haywire’ arrangement. On the whole, however, W/T communications were satisfactory, and all credit is due to the two operators for their untiring work throughout the time the mission was in France. This is particularly so in view of the fact that they also occupied themselves with other matters and in the end probably had an average of three hours sleep at night for several weeks. Many nights none of us, of course, ever slept at all.

In the latter stages of our mission, after liberation, complications arose as various regions became organised by the military authorities. The status of the F.F.I. became extremely doubtful and many courageous officers and men, a great number of whom had been resisters for two and three years, become uncertain of their status and were even black guarded for having joined the F.F.I. at all. In spite of this, they were extremely devoted, not only to our services but also to what they considered their national duty.

It is to be trusted that the services of these men will be properly and duly recognised in the weeks to come.

It will be recalled that I refused in the beginning to accept the arrival of SAS troops. I was neither adequately prepared to receive them or give them any assistance, nor had proper supplies been sent to the areas affected, nor were their services in the least required since the existing groups could deal adequately with the targets, the lists of which I had already seen.

I eventually received a JED team, for reasons which remain obscure to me. I did, however, receive them in a spirit of friendly co-operation and gave them a task. It was unfortunate they arrived so late that there was virtually nothing for them to do and I am afraid that as a result, they continued not to know what to do, and their briefing was, to say the least of it, peculiar, with regard to their position vis a vis organised groups and senior missions. More surprising to me was that they quickly appeared to have little or no knowledge of how to prepare a reception. It was only by the grace of God that one of the receptions, which I had left to them in collaboration with one of my French lieutenants, did not come off, as the aeroplanes did not arrive. I shudder to think what would have happened if they had.

At the risk of appearing to have a series of perpetual grouses, I should also like to point out that on one or two occasions the messages for particular grounds were mixed up and that on four nights we were given B.B.C. messages when the weather was perfectly clear, and no aircraft came. This was probably due to the very bad weather in England but I merely make the point to emphasise the difficulties against which we had to fight.

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4. COMMENTS ON THE GENERAL SITUATION AND THE AREAS AFFECTED

Although we were continuously in contact with the AUBE department and the DIPLOMAT circuit, I shall make no comments on this area since it will undoubtedly be well covered in DIPLOMAT’s report. I do wish, however, to pay tribute in passing to the extraordinary efficiency with which existing elements in that department had been organised by DIPLOMAT and the tact with which he, in the latter stages, combined forces totally with Commandant MONTCALM, leader of the F.F.I. I was present at a meeting when comparative fusion was decided and the atmosphere was one of the most complete cordiality.

As far as the MARNE is concerned, conditions there had been made extremely difficult by the arrest, some time previously, of the Marquis de VOGUE, who was undoubtedly and deservedly regarded as the unanimously accepted chief of resistance there. His arrest and that of a number of other leaders contributed to some confusion and to the subsequent atmosphere of mistrust and reluctance to come out into the open. From this point of view the present mission I have found to be the most trying I have carried out. I could not help appreciating the reasons for this atmosphere, but, on the other hand, in clandestine work, it is necessary sometimes to “bet on a hunch”, for if all the rules of security are perpetually obeyed stagnation is likely to result.

The fear of the Gestapo, which itself was not so strong as in some other departments, remained paramount and it was extremely difficult for a time to persuade people either of one’s bona fides or to tum to constructive action. There was an uneasy and heavy air about such towns as EPERNAY and CHALONS, which had to be dispersed before we could get going. At the risk of repeating myself, I must once more emphasise that had we been in a position properly to arm people the work would have gone much more smoothly and more quickly. The Marais, however, had I think, already had a fair dose of talk about resistance, but little practical help.

I found that targets in the MARNE were not being attacked with nearly sufficient frequency owing to the lack of means, but everything possible was ultimately done to the detriment of the German war effort in those parts. While on the subject of targets, I should like to bring to the attention of H.Q. the fact that we had received instructions to cut all underground and overhead telecommunications.

We were starting to do this when an order came over the B.B.C. from General Koenig himself to say that telecommunications must not be touched in order preserve them for the advancing allied armies and that on the contrary, they were to be preserved. This gave rise to some confusion of mind, and in one or two cases, owing to lack of communication, lines were cut after that order had been given. As quickly as possible, however, the orders were reversed.

In a general manner of speaking, both in the MARNE and the HAUTE MARNE, it was sometimes difficult to choose between certain resistance groups, since, while some of them were only awaiting the time and the means for action, others were preparing only civil and political changes after liberation.

It would have been easy to differentiate between the two had the latter groups not also been trying to collect arms. Since they refused in some cases to participate in patrols, it was difficult to see what use those arms could be to them. and I accordingly thought it better to do nothing about them.

In the HAUTE MARNE, where a recent, but I think the only big Gestapo round-up had taken place, the atmosphere of prudence, except in the case of some groups, was even more accentuated; and although the existing groups were enthusiastic and eager, I think they were not sufficiently numerous to carry out all the work that could have been done in that large department – a difficult one, in any case, owing to the number of forests and woods in this region. It is for that reason that at the time of our CHAUMONT operation I asked for reinforcements from other departments, a decision which was not in the least resented, but, on the contrary, applauded by local resisters.

It will be appreciated, however, that on the whole two difficulties arise on such occasions:

1) It is difficult sometimes to transplant men to a strange department where they are apt to feel like foreigners.
2) After the liberation of their home districts, men are liable to feel that they have a right at least to get back to their normal activities.

The selection of men for transplanting is, therefore, a delicate one if strict and necessary discipline is to be maintained.

In the HAUTE MARNE there existed a number of marquis, one or two of which appeared to me of a highly doubtful character; and one of them, in particular, I strongly suspect of having been led by a German double agent. Some pillaging and requisitioning at the point of the revolver were carried out by anonymous groups of this kind, and this action contributed to an uneasy feeling among the population with regard to armed groups in the district. The responsible elements, however, were good if sometimes inexperienced, and were gluttons for work. There were occasions when, after twenty-four-hour patrols, I thought it right to give the men a thorough rest, but they actually complained to me, on many occasions, that they wanted more work.

It was by means of their untiring efforts that we were able to plot the German evasion routes, of which there were four around MONTIER-en-DER, two of them circumventing the town by the north and two by the south. There was evidence that the groups of Germans coming along them had been given definite routes and that they had instituted a system of guides as well as signals. Without wishing to accuse anyone, we were given strongly to suspect on several occasions that there were also some resident helpers in the district. With the means at our disposal we were not able to keep a check on all four routes at once, and time and time again we found that if we particularly blocked two routes. the other two were those used on that particular night.

On the whole, except in one or two cases, the Germans on these routes did not appear to have any offensive intentions unless they found themselves blocked or attacked, and they were then extremely efficient. Their obvious intention, as indicated to us by the U.S. Third Army, was to move eastwards and northwards for the purpose of regrouping. I think it is an accepted fact in all competent circles that the Germans had not only organised themselves very efficiently during the time of retreat but also organised a network of officers and N.C.O’s in civilian clothes and with proper French papers, to remain behind for the purpose of fermenting or assisting any possible disorders which might subsequently ensue. Undoubtedly a number of Gestapo men have remained, and it may be quite difficult, in a number of cases, to dislodge them since they often speak perfect French.

When I first sent Lieutenant Cormier to the HAUTE MARNE, I was bothered in my professional spirit by the number of German trains circulating on the railway lines in those parts. This was largely due I think to the fact that no definite instructions appeared to have been given, and there was no material with which to carry out adequate sabotage. The proof of this, I think, is that even with the small amount of material we were able eventually to obtain, we had good results and in what had been a comparatively quiet area for the Germans, the latter became considerably hampered by the action taken.

Once we had established proper contact with the F.F.I. and military authorities in the MARNE and HAUTE MARNE and were able to co-ordinate the work, the relations were most gratifying, and friendly; and I wish to thank them all for the hospitality and assistance they rendered us. I think it is not my place here to make any comments with regard to the political situation which is. after all, purely a french domestic affair.

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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Taking into account the difficulties T have enumerated above, I think it is reasonable to say that the PEDLAR mission accomplished the maximum within its power of its assignment. There is not the slightest doubt that had it been able to go out a couple of months earlier the results would have been immeasurably greater.

In spite of this, however, much interference was caused to the Wehrmacht, I can only speak in terms of the highest praise of all the members of this mission, both in regard to their enthusiasm their bearing, their devotion to duty and their tact. In addition, I particularly wish to mention the two men lent to me by DIPLOMAT, Jean LEMONNIER and Louis JOURDAIN. Their loyalty and devotion deserves the highest praise and, quite honestly particularly in the latter case, T do not know what I should have done without him. He acted in almost every possible capacity, from saboteur to “Q” man, and never seemed to sleep.

In addition, two French officers who were with us gave us the most remarkable assistance. One was Lieutenant de la HAMAYDE of the French cavalry, the other was Lieutenant GASPARD, in command of a company of DIPLOMAT’s men (real name HESSE), who was untiring and courageous. I should be grateful if these four men, in particular, could receive some distant mark of appreciation for their services.

In respect of members of the PEDLAR mission, I beg the privilege of making formal recommendations for suitable decoration of Captain Harratt, Lieutenant Cormier Sergeant Roe and Sergeant Sowden. Their work, both in the sphere of our organisation and in the service of France is to be most highly commended.

Signed
Major Bodington

Related topics

1. A short history of The 4th Hussars
2. Captain Percy John Harratt’s Report
3. Captain Percy John Harratt DSO MC and Bar